We develop a signalling-game theoretical model to study a policy that publicly reports hospital waiting times. We characterize two effects of such a policy: the "competition effect" that drives hospitals to compete for patients by increasing service rates and reducing waiting times, and the "signalling effect" that allows patients to distinguish a high-quality hospital from a low-quality one. While both effects help reduce the waiting time of the low-quality hospital, they act in opposite directions for the high-quality hospital's waiting time. We show that the competition effect on the high-quality hospital will outweigh the signalling effect, and consequently both hospitals' waiting times will be reduced after the policy. Empirically we suggest how to exploit the timing in implementing the policy, and provide a set of hypothesis tests for the presence of competition effect, signalling effect, and the policy's overall effect on waiting times.
Introduction
Long hospital waiting times, especially those for elective treatments in public hospitals, are a signi…cant policy concern in many OECD countries. Many policies have been introduced to tackle the problem. 1 Among them some policies aim at assisting patients by revealing hospitals'waiting times. For example, in 2004 the National Health Service in Portugal created a nation-wide system, dubbed SIGIC, to share with patients waiting-time information of all public and private providers. The UK launched the NHS Choices web site in 2007 and the site now allows users to compare hospitals in their local area on indicators including waiting times for many common procedures. 2 In 2010, the Australian government introduced the My Hospitals web site, which publishes waiting times of all public hospitals. 3 As these policies are part of a recent trend where regulators issue performance "report cards" 4 for health care providers, we call them "waiting time report cards" (WTRCs). Supporters of WTRCs argue that the policies can help reduce waiting times, because they help direct patients to hospitals with shorter waiting times, which in turn provides hospitals with incentives to operate more e¢ ciently. 5 However, this argument neglects the fact that, not only may the hospitals di¤er in waiting times, they may also have di¤erent treatment qualities. It is likely that some patients do not know which hospital provides better treatment. After seeing the report cards, uninformed patients may conclude that a hospital with a longer waiting time is more popular because its treatment is better. This kind of situation is not unique to hospitals. For instance, a parent may infer that a school with a longer waiting list o¤ers better education. Similarly, an inexperienced consumer may choose to wait at a full restaurant rather than going to an alternative with few customers. If the uninformed patients are willing to pursue the better treatment at the expense of waiting, then the WTRCs may result in an even longer waiting time in a hospital that is inundated already. In this paper we develop a theoretical model to examine the policy's e¤ects on hospitals and patients simultaneously. Key variables such as hospital patient volume and waiting time are determined endogenously. To capture the issue that treatment qualities are asymmetric information but may be inferred from the WTRCs, we resort to the signalling-game theory. In our model, two hospitals compete for patients. A proportion of patients know the treatment qualities, possibly from general practitioners and / or word-of-mouth, while the other patients do not. The WTRCs publish hospital waiting times, which the uninformed patients may use as signals of treatment qualities. We characterize two e¤ects of the WTRCs, namely the "competition e¤ect" and the "signalling e¤ect". The former drives the hospitals to compete for patients. The latter leads to more previously uninformed patients going to the high-quality hospital. The competition e¤ect helps reduce waiting times. The signalling e¤ect, however, has a negative impact on the waiting time of the low-quality hospital but a positive impact on the waiting time of the high-quality hospital.
To illustrate the competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect, we conduct the analysis in three steps. We start from a benchmark case where the WTRCs are absent. Next, with the WTRCs, we …rst study the situation where hospitals have the same treatment quality. Last we investigate the general case where the hospitals di¤er in treatment qualities. When hospitals have the same treatment quality, patients will only prefer the one with a shorter waiting time, and thus the WTRCs may have the competition e¤ect but not the signalling e¤ect. The three-step approach therefore allows us to separate the competition e¤ect from the signalling e¤ect at the second step, before we investigate the policy's overall e¤ect on waiting times at the third step.
We obtain two main results. First, we show that the competition e¤ect arises from the WTRCs'function as a commitment device. In the model the hospitals are able to increase their capacities, and thus decrease waiting times, through their choice of (costly) service rates. Since waiting times can be reduced by increasing service rates, the fact that patients value lower waiting times implies that hospitals may have an incentive to compete for patients. The incentive, however, is blocked in the absence of the WTRCs. This is because without the WTRCs patients cannot infer the hospitals'service rates from waiting times, and thus they do not base their choices of hospitals on the service rates. As it is costly to increase service rates, the hospitals …nd it optimal to keep the service rates low. By contrast, by disclosing waiting times, the WTRCs allow the hospitals to demonstrate that they have committed to higher service rates. As a result, in the setting where hospitals have the same treatment quality, the WTRCs drives the hospitals to compete for patients by increasing service rates, and consequently waiting times drop.
Secondly, in the general case where hospitals di¤er in treatment qualities, we show that if the WTRCs cause both hospitals to increase service rates, then for the high-quality hospital the competition e¤ect will outweigh the signalling e¤ect. Consequently, the waiting times of both hospitals will decrease. The reason is two-fold. First, when patients switch from the lowquality hospital to the high-quality hospital, the patient volume of the former decreases. As a consequence the low-quality hospital's waiting time drops, making it relatively more attractive to the patients. Secondly, when the competition e¤ect is high, the low-quality hospital also engages itself in increasing the service rate. This further curbs the patient ‡ow to the highquality hospital. Hence overall the percentage increase of the high-quality hospital's patient volume is less than that of its service rate.
The theoretical model has clear implications for empirical research. We show that the actual timing in the implementation of the WTRCs can be exploited to separately identify the presence of the competition and signalling e¤ects. The theoretical model results in predictions for critical outcome variables which we formulate in a set of statistical hypotheses that can be taken to the data and formally tested. Such tests can be conducted readily using standard hospital administrative data sets. To evaluate the WTRCs we suggest to fully utilize the outcome variables, including not only waiting times but also waiting lists (patient volumes) and service rates.
Our study is related to two strands of literature. The …rst is the theoretical studies on hospital waiting times following Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) , including Iversen (1993) , Farnworth (2003) , and Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2008). A common assumption in this literature is that hospital treatment qualities and waiting times are common knowledge. To study the WTRCs, in this paper we explore the possibilities that patients learn hospitals'waiting times from the WTRCs before they choose hospitals, and that hospital treatment qualities may not be known to all patients. Our study contributes to the literature by characterizing the signalling e¤ect, as well as the competition e¤ect of the WTRCs. We also point out that the hospitals' lack of commitment to increasing service rates can be a source of excessively long waiting times in the absence of the WTRCs.
Secondly, our paper is related to the strand of literature on health care report cards (Dranove and Jin 2010). Theoretical studies on this topic include Gravelle and Sivey (2010), Chen (2011) and Ma and Mak (forthcoming). While the previous studies focus on quality report cards, this paper speci…cally studies report cards for waiting times. Despite their prevalence, hospital quality report cards are generally restricted to a small minority of procedures (heart surgery as a common example) where "hard" quality information such as mortality rate is available for reporting. For many common elective procedures (e.g. cataract surgery), such "hard" quality information may be too time-consuming and costly for the government agencies to collect, whereas it is much easier to report waiting times. Our model is therefore applicable to the much larger proportion of hospital procedures for which waiting time is reported but not quality. Moreover, our study of the signalling e¤ect shows that reporting waiting times can also help reveal quality information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, with the analysis conducted in the aforementioned three-step approach. In Section 3 we present an empirical framework to test the main theoretical results. In Section 4 we discuss a few extensions of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model:
Set-up
There are two periods, indexed by t 2 f1; 2g, with two hospitals i 2 fA; Bg. In each period there is a continuum of patients with volume 1, who will be active for one period. A patient, indexed by j, seeks a treatment that can be provided by either hospital. The quality of the treatment patient j receives from hospital i is denoted by q i . Speci…cally, one hospital's quality of treatment is q h while the other's is q l , with q h q l . A proportion 2 (0; 1] of patients are informed about the hospitals'treatment qualities, possibly from informed general practitioners or via word of mouth, while the other proportion (1 ) of patients are uninformed, and hold the prior belief that (q A = q h ; q B = q l ) and (q A = q l ; q B = q h ) are equally likely. When clear in the context below, we will use l in the subscript to denote the q l -type hospital (low-quality hospital), and h to denote the q h -type hospital (high-quality hospital). For ease of analysis, assume that the utility of not receiving any treatment is su¢ ciently low so that all patients will seek treatment.
Similar to Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) , at the beginning of period 1 each hospital sets a service rate s i , which stipulates the number of patients to be treated per unit of time. For example, if the length of each period is one year and a unit within a period is one week, then s i indicates how many patients the hospital will treat in each week. To implement the service rate a hospital incurs costs to invest in its capacity, such as acquiring diagnostic and surgical equipment, recruiting medical sta¤, and adding the facility of post-surgery care. We assume that the marginal cost of implementing the service rate is constant at c > 0. 6 The service rate, once set, will remain the same in both periods.
7 6 This assumption ensures tractability of the analysis, and we discuss the situations with heterogenous costs and a more general cost function form in Section 4. 7 As to be seen more clearly in the analysis, this assumption is equivalent to assuming that, due to the certi…cate-of-need type of regulation, a hospital can increase its capacity (service rate) in each period, but once increased the capacity cannot be scaled back, or at least not in the short run. In Section 4.5 we discuss in more details the situation where the hospitals can vary service rates across periods.
A patient j's utility from receiving treatment at hospital i depends on the treatment quality and her waiting time w ij , with U j (q i ; w ij ) = q i w ij , where > 0 is a parameter measuring the marginal disutility of delay of treatment. This speci…cation is similar to that in Brekke et al. (2008) , and also consistent with the formulation in Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) , where the delay of treatment due to waiting reduces patients'bene…t. We assume that patients are covered by a public health insurance, and the out-of-pocket expenditure is identical in each hospital and thus normalized to zero.
For tractability, we assume that in each period patients choose the hospitals simultaneously. 8 Denote by n t i the volume of patients at hospital i in period t. 9 Thus the median waiting time at hospital i in period t is w
. 10 Since patients move simultaneously, each patient bases her decision on comparing the expected utilities from the hospitals. For example, if a patient knows (q i ; s i ) and that the patient volume of the hospital is n t i , then the patient's expected utility from choosing the hospital is q i 1 2
Note that while q i refers to the treatment quality, from a patient's perspective a hospital's overall quality is re ‡ected in the vector (q i ; s i ). In the set-up, to facilitate the analysis, we keep q i …xed while allow s i to be a choice variable of the hospital. Meanwhile, since the time frame to evaluate a WTRC policy is usually a few years, q i can be regarded as representing a component of a hospital's quality, such as experience gained from years of operation, which remains …xed in the short term, whereas s i represents a component of the hospital's quality that is the hospital's strategic choice. In Section 4 we will discuss the possibility that investing on s i may have an impact on q i .
where is a Diagnosis-related Group (DRG) payment, < is a constant marginal cost of providing the treatment, and measures the marginal cost of increasing the service rate. For ease of notation, we introduce the parameter c = =( ). Because measures the net bene…t of treating a patient, c can be interpreted as the relative marginal cost of improving the service rate. Thus we can normalize the pro…t function to i = i =(
cs i . The hospitals are assumed to maximize pro…ts. 12 8 More realistically, each hospital will face a ‡ow of patients that can arrive at any time within a period. However, there will be a complication if we model the ‡ow of patients in a continuous-time setting, because it means that there will be patients that arrive close to the end of period 1, and will be carried over to period 2. Similarly there will be patients remaining on the waiting list by the end of period 2, which entails the third period and so on, and thus an in…nite horizon. 9 Since every patient will choose a hospital, there is n t A = 1 n t B . 10 As a result of our set-up, the median waiting time is equal to the mean waiting time. 11 In Section 4 we discuss the possibility that, after knowing her actual waiting time at a hospital, a patient may switch to the other hospital. 12 Although we expect hospitals' objective functions to be far more complex in reality than maximizing pro…ts, this doesn't detract from the relevance of our model. Even in public health care systems, hospitals usually have an incentive to balance their budget, create a surplus, or minimize losses. In the increasingly At the end of period 1, a waiting-time report card will be issued for each hospital i. Consistent with existing policies such as the My Hospitals website in Australia, we assume that the report card shows period-1 median waiting time w 1 i and patient volume n 1 i . Without the WTRC, a hospital's service rate s i is assumed to be unobservable to patients. But since
, the features of the report cards then imply that patients will be able to infer s i from the WTRC. Figure 1 below shows the timeline of the model. To facilitate the analysis, we rule out the possibility that a hospital chooses to shut down, i.e. setting s i = 0. Toward this end we use a s > 0 to denote the minimum service rate imposed by the regulator. In principle, setting s is similar to setting a target of maximum waiting time for each patient. Because we analyse a situation where governments are using the WTRCs as a policy tool, it is more interesting to analyse the situation where any maximum waiting time targets are not binding. Therefore it is more plausible to focus on the situation where s is low, which leads to the following assumption. For ease of notation, denote
by s .
13
Assumption 1: s < s common policy framework where hospitals are reimbursed for every patient treated (as in DRG payments), these incentives imply an incentive to increase the volume of patients treated, provided the DRG payment is above marginal cost. Our model is therefore relevant for analyzing hospitals'…nancial incentives with regard to attracting more patients. 13 It can be veri…ed that s > 0: (i) For q h > q l , s > 0 is equivalent to
Technically, Assumption 1 allows us to restrict the attention to the scenario where the report cards have e¤ects on both hospitals'service rates, that is, where the equilibrium service rates are an interior solution.
14 Moreover, the assumption ensures that when the treatment qualities are common knowledge, each hospital will receive some patients even if they choose the minimum service rate, 15 which, to be shown below, is a benchmark result when the WTRCs are not e¤ective. A hospital's strategy, therefore, is to choose a service rate s i s given its type, and can be summarized by a function i : fq l ; q h g ! [s; 1). Denote by P a patient's mixed action set f(p A ; p B ) j p A + p B = 1 and p i 0 for i 2 fA; Bgg. An element of the action set, (p A ; p B ); means that for i 2 fA; Bg with probability p i the patient will choose hospital i. Denote a strategy of an informed patient j in period t by J t j , where J 1 j 2 P and J 2 j is a mapping from j's information set in period 2, which consists of the information from the hospitals'report card results, to P. Similarly, denote a strategy of an uninformed patient y in period t by L t y , where L 1 y 2 P and L 2 y is a mapping from y's information set in period 2, which consists of the information from the hospitals'report card results, to P.
It is worth noting the di¤erence between the strategy spaces of the patients in period 1 and period 2 as a result of introducing the WTRCs. For the period-1 informed patients, since they do not observe the hospitals'service rates, their strategies amount to choosing a hospital given the hospitals'treatment qualities. But for the period-2 informed patients, as they learn the hospitals'service rates from the WTRCs, they can base their choices on the service rates in addition to the hospitals'treatment qualities. Similarly, for the period-1 uninformed patients, they can only choose the hospitals based on their prior beliefs about the hospitals'treatment qualities. But the period-2 uninformed patients will take into account the observed service rates, as well as the hospitals'types if these can be inferred from the WTRCs.
Analysis
The solution concept is a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), consisting of a strategy pro…le ( ) and a belief system, such that (i) given the other players' strategies speci…ed in the pro…le each player's strategy is sequentially rational, (ii) the belief system is consistent with the strategy pro…le, and (iii) To illustrate the impacts of the policy, we compare the equilibrium outcomes with and without the WTRCs. To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we …rst present the following preliminary results, which are independent of the e¤ectiveness of the WTRCs: First, with or without the report cards, the uninformed patients in the …rst period will equally randomize between the hospitals following their prior belief. That is, L 1e = (
): Second, given the period-1 uninformed patients' equilibrium strategies, the period-1 informed patients'best response to the hospitals'service rates (s h ; s l ) is as follows: (i) all the period-1 informed patients will choose the high-quality hospital, i.e.
(ii) all the period-1 informed patients will choose the low-quality hospital, i.e.
and (iii) if the above inequalities do not hold, the period-1 informed patients'will randomize between the hospitals'with
Intuitively, if the high-quality hospital's treatment quality is su¢ ciently higher than the lowquality hospital, then all the informed patients will choose the high-quality hospital even though this will result in a longer waiting time of the hospital. But if q h is not much higher than q l while the low-quality hospital's service rate is su¢ ciently high, then it is possible that all informed patients will prefer the low-quality hospital. In between these two polar cases, the informed patients will be indi¤erent between the hospitals, and thus some informed patients may choose the high-quality hospital, with the others choosing the low-quality hospital. Third, given the informed and uninformed patients' strategies in period 1, a hospital's period-1 patient volume n 1 i is …xed, and is independent of its choice of service rate s i .
Without waiting-time report cards
Suppose the WTRC policy is ine¤ective. Because patients cannot observe the hospitals'service rates, the strategy space of the period-2 informed (uninformed) patients is the same as the strategy space of the informed (uninformed) patients in period 1. Consequently, the period-2 informed patients act in the same way as their period-1 counterpart, as characterized in the second preliminary result. Similarly, in both periods the uninformed patients will equally randomize between the hospitals, i.e. L 1e = L 2e = (
). Since patients cannot base their choice of hospital on service rates, the hospitals'patient volumes in both periods are …xed given the patients'strategies. That is, the patient volumes are independent of the service rates. Because it is costly to increase service rates, the hospitals' best response is to choose the minimum service rate s. The proposition below summarizes this result. Proof. The proof is essentially the analysis preceding the proposition.
Proposition 1 shows that, in the absence of the WTRC policy, hospitals cannot commit to higher service rates because increased service rates cannot be communicated to the patients. It then prompts us to conjecture that, because the WTRCs can reveal the service rates via disclosing the waiting times and the patient volumes, they may allow the hospitals to compete for patients with increased service rates and lower waiting times. To illustrate the WTRCs' e¤ects more clearly, we will …rst study the case where the hospitals have identical quality, i.e. q h = q l , before we study the more general case with q h > q l .
With waiting time report cards; q h = q l
If q h = q l , the model becomes a special case of = 1. Thus belief updating in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is degenerated, and the solution concept coincides with the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, let q h = q l = q.
The main result is summarized by the proposition below, which shows that the hospitals' equilibrium service rates can be characterized by two categories, depending on the level of the minimum service rate s:
Proposition 2 With the waiting time report cards, if q l = q h , the hospitals' equilibrium service rates are:
Proof. When the hospitals have the same quality, it is easy to rule out the case where in equilibrium one hospital has all the patients in a period, since in that case some patients will be better o¤ by deviating to the other hospital. So in equilibrium it must be that 
The hospitals'objective functions are C 2 and strictly concave with respect to the control variables, with
and
First consider an auxiliary case with s = 0 and s i > s. Using the standard optimization technique, we can derive each hospital's best response with respect to the service rate of the other hospital:
We have . 16 Although not directly related to the analysis, the result that n Comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 1, we see that the WTRCs lead to higher service rates when the minimum service rate s is low. This is attributed to the policy's competition e¤ect: Because through the WTRCs the hospitals can demonstrate their service rates to the period-2 patients, their incentive to compete for patients drives them to increase service rates. In other words, in contrast to the hospitals'lack of commitment in Proposition 1, the WTRCs allow the hospitals to commit to higher service rates. Speci…cally, when the hospitals have the same quality, else equal each patient prefers the hospital with a higher service rate. Given the other hospital's service rate, each hospital's best response is to choose the service rate such that the marginal cost of increasing the service rate, c, equals the "marginal revenue", measured by the marginal increase of period-2 patient volume. Note that the marginal revenue is decreasing with the other hospital's service rate ( @ 2 n 2 i @s i @s i < 0), therefore if the other hospital chooses a low service rate, then a hospital will choose a higher service rate, as re ‡ected in the increasing parts of the best response functions in Figure 3 . Hence when s is low the equilibrium service rate is higher than s. If we measure the magnitude of the competition e¤ect by the percentage increase of service rate, i.e. (1=4c s) =s, then we can see that the lower the s, the larger the competition e¤ect. On the other hand, if s is su¢ ciently high, @ 2 n 2 i @s i @s i < 0 implies that a hospital's marginal revenue from increasing the service rate will fall below the marginal cost, and thus, as Figure 4 shows, the hospital will keep its service rate at s. In other words, the competition e¤ect vanishes when s is high.
Propositions 1 and 2 challenge the conventional wisdom that waiting times imply hospitals are operating at full capacity, and thus have no incentive to compete for patients. The conventional viewpoint relies on the assumption of …xed capacities, whereas in the present study we endogenize the hospitals' choice of service rates. We show that hospitals with waiting times actually have the incentive to compete for patients, and with the help of the WTRCs they will compete by increasing service rates.
Intuitively, when hospitals have the same quality, increasing service rates will lead to shortened waiting times in equilibrium, as the corollary below con…rms.
, the hospitals' equilibrium waiting times are shorter with the WTRCs than without.
Proof. With or without the WTRCs, because the hospitals have the same quality and the same service rate, in equilibrium in each period a hospital's patient volume is 1 2 . Therefore in each period a hospital's medium waiting time is w , it follows that with the WTRCs hospitals' equilibrium waiting times are shorter than when the policy is ine¤ective.
With waiting time report cards; q h > q l
Two report cards are regarded as di¤erent if they di¤er in either waiting time w , and so the period-1 informed patients in the low-quality hospital have the incentive to deviate to the high-quality hospital, which is a contradiction.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is as follows: Regardless of the volume of informed patients, their presence means that if the two hospitals have the same waiting times and the same patient volumes, the informed patients will strictly prefer the high-quality hospital. Their choices, in turn, will break the ties of the hospitals'waiting times and patient volumes, ruling out the existence of a pooling equilibrium.
In the next proposition, we derive the hospitals'service rates in equilibrium.
Proposition 3
With the WTRCs and q h > q l , the hospitals'equilibrium service rates are
Proof. In Appendix 1. The e¤ects of the WTRCs can be illustrated by comparing Proposition 3 with Proposition 2 and Proposition 1. We present our analysis through a series of corollaries below. Corollary 2 compares the policy's competition e¤ect with that when q h = q l . Corollary 3 demonstrates the policy's signalling e¤ect. In Corollary 4, we investigate the policy's overall e¤ect on hospital waiting times. Corollary 5 conducts comparative-static studies with respect to parameters in the hospitals'payo¤ function.
Corollary 2 (i)
The high-quality hospital chooses a higher service rate than the low-quality hospital, i.e. s (ii) The low-quality hospital's service rate is lower than when q h = q l , i.e. s if q h q l > c .
Proof. In Appendix 1.
As Corollary 2 (i) shows, the competition e¤ect drives both hospitals to increase their service rates, and the high-quality hospital's service rate increases more than the low-quality hospital. The reason is that, for the same increase of service rate, the high-quality hospital attracts more patients than the low-quality hospital because patients not only bene…t from the reduction of waiting times but also from the hospital's higher quality. Thus, else equal, the di¤erence in qualities leads to a higher marginal revenue from increasing the service rate for the high-quality hospital than for the low quality hospital. 17 As a result the high-quality hospital has a stronger incentive to increase its service rate. Corollary 2 (ii) and (iii) are based on a comparison of Proposition 3 and Proposition 2. Interpretation of the results entails a closer look at the hospitals' marginal revenues. Corollary 2 (ii) shows that the low-quality hospital chooses a lower service rate than when the treatment qualities are identical. This is because for the low-quality hospital, its marginal revenue decreases as the di¤erence between the qualities increases.
18 Intuitively, as the quality discrepancy q h q l becomes larger, patients are more willing to choose the high quality hospital, and thus the low-quality hospital …nds it more di¢ cult to attract patients by increasing the service rate, and its incentive drops. In other words, the competition e¤ect on the low-quality hospital diminishes as q h q l increases. Following Corollary 2 (ii) one may expect the competition e¤ect on the high-quality hospital to increase with q h q l . However, Corollary 2 (iii) suggests otherwise. When q h is close to q l , the high-quality hospital's service rate will be larger than when q h = q l . But when q h is su¢ ciently high, its service rate drops. That is, as q h q l increases, the competition e¤ect on the high-quality hospital …rst increases and then diminishes. To see the intuition, note that the high quality hospital's marginal revenue is increasing with the quality di¤erence, 19 so a small quality di¤erence will drive the high-quality hospital to choose a higher service rate than when the qualities are identical. However, as discussed in Corollary 2 (ii), when the quality di¤erence becomes larger, the low-quality hospital's service rate decreases. The lower the s l , the easier it is for the high-quality hospital to attract patients, which drives down its incentive to increase the service rate. With q h > q l and s e h > s e l , it follows immediately that the high quality hospital receives more patients than the low quality hospital in both periods. To illustrate the signalling e¤ect, however, we need to compare the high-quality hospital's period-1 patients with its period-2 patients.
Corollary 3 There exists
The marginal revenue of the high-quality hospital is
Corollary 3 shows that if the volume of uninformed patients is su¢ ciently large ( su¢ -ciently small), then the high-quality hospital will receive more patients in the second period than in the …rst period. This is attributed to the WTRCs'signalling e¤ect, which allows the uninformed patients to distinguish the high quality hospital from the low quality one. It is easier to illustrate the signalling e¤ect if we consider the polar case ! 0. In this case, since in period 1 the uninformed patients equally randomize between the hospitals, each hospital's patient volume is 1 2 . But in period 2, the uninformed patients infer the hospitals'types from the report cards, and therefore more patients choose the high-quality hospital, resulting in
. For a general > 0, since service rates are constant in both periods, the signalling e¤ect on a hospital can be measured by n 2e i n 1e i . Corollary 3 then implies that for a su¢ -ciently small the WTRCs have a positive signalling e¤ect on the high-quality hospital, and a negative signalling e¤ect on the low-quality hospital. Moreover, for < the magnitude (absolute value) of the signalling e¤ect increases when decreases: The fewer the informed patients, the more the uninformed patients that use report cards to infer hospital qualities.
Having discussed the WTRCs'competition e¤ect and signalling e¤ect separately, now we can analyze the policy's overall e¤ect on the hospitals'waiting times.
Corollary 4
In each period both hospitals'waiting times are shorter than when there are no report cards.
To discuss the WTRCs'overall e¤ects on hospital waiting times, we …rst summarize the competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect on the hospitals in the table below. Table 1 The " " sign on the table indicates that the e¤ect helps to lower the hospital's waiting time, while the "+" sign indicates that the e¤ect drives up the hospital's waiting time.
In the …rst period, because the uninformed patients have no access to the report card results, there is no signalling e¤ect. The competition e¤ect drives both hospitals to increase service rates. As a result, both hospitals'waiting times become shorter than when the policy is ine¤ective.
In the second period, thanks to the signalling e¤ect, more previously uninformed patients are willing to choose the high-quality hospital. Therefore, for the low-quality hospital, the competition e¤ect (higher service rate) and the signalling e¤ect (fewer patients) both reduce its waiting time.
For the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time, the competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect point to opposite directions. The signalling e¤ect alone will increase the waiting time but the competition e¤ect lowers it. Corollary 4 indicates that the competition e¤ect outweighs the signalling e¤ect, and overall the WTRCs result in a shorter period-2 waiting time for the high-quality hospital. Intuitively, there are two driving forces that drive the competition e¤ect to dominate the signalling e¤ect. First, when patients switch from the lowquality hospital to the high-quality hospital after seeing the report cards, the patient volume of the low-quality hospital drops. As a result, the low-quality hospital's waiting time becomes shorter, making the hospital relatively more attractive to patients and slowing the ‡ow of patients to the high-quality hospital. In other words, a 1% increase of s h results in less than 1% increase of n 2 h . Secondly, the low-quality hospital also engages itself in the competition and increases its service rate. This further helps it to retain patients.
From a technical perspective, so far we have restricted the analysis to under Assumption 1, which con…nes s to small values and thus allows us to focus on the setting where the WTRCs cause both hospitals to increase service rates. As discussed after Proposition 2, the competition e¤ect increases as s decreases. Therefore, technically Assumption 1 implies a setting with a large competition e¤ect. In the proof in Appendix 1 we show that even with the maximum signalling e¤ect (i.e. ! 0), the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time still decreases after the WTRCs.
Following Proposition 3, we also conduct comparative-static studies with respect to the parameters in the hospitals'payo¤ function. The corollary below summarizes.
Corollary 5 (i) For the high-quality hospital, the service rate increases with the DRG price, i.e. (ii) For the low-quality hospital,
while
Intuitively, when the DRG price increases, hospitals see a larger net bene…t from treating a patient, and thus the incentive to compete for patients goes up. By contrast, when the marginal cost of treatment becomes larger, the hospitals' net bene…t from providing the treatment drops, and so does the incentive to increase the service rate. These are con…rmed by Corollary 5 (i) for the high-quality hospital. However, as Corollary 5 (ii) shows, for the low-quality hospital the intuitive results hold only if the di¤erence between the treatment qualities is small. When q h is su¢ ciently larger than q l , for an increase of , the highquality hospital's decision to further increase s e h will attract so many patients that the lowquality hospital's marginal revenue of service rate goes below the marginal cost. As a result, the low-quality hospital respond optimally by lowering its service rate.
Empirical Implications
The above theoretical results generate three testable predictions: First, via the competition e¤ect, the WTRCs drive hospitals to increase service rates. Secondly, via the signalling e¤ect, the WTRCs lead to more (fewer) patients in the high-quality (low-quality) hospital in period 2 than in period 1. Thirdly, overall the WTRCs result in a lower waiting time in each hospital. We formulate these predictions in a set of hypotheses that can be taken to the data and tested empirically. In order to conduct these hypothesis tests, we propose to optimally exploit the actual timing in the implementation of the WTRCs, which we turn to next.
Channels and Timing
The competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect occur at distinct points in time during the implementation of the WTRCs. As the timeline in Figure 1 illustrates, period 1 is the time during which a government agency collects waiting time data with the explicit intention of public reporting. Hospitals would typically be mandated to participate and cooperate in data collection e¤orts. At the beginning of period 2, the waiting time data are published in the form of the WTRCs. Moreover, as studied in Section 2.2.1, we can denote the time prior to the policy as 'period 0', in which no data on waiting times are being collected. 20 According to the theoretical model, period 1 presents an intermediate period during which hospitals strategically set their service rates while patients do not yet know hospitals'waiting times or quality types. Only at the beginning of period 2, when the WTRCs are being published do patients learn about hospitals'waiting times and, in addition, are able to infer hospitals'quality types. This, in turn, a¤ects the patient volume at each hospital.
This discussion highlights the discrepancy in timing of the competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect as well as the di¤erent channels through which they manifest. The competition e¤ect occurs at the beginning of period 1 and can be measured by the change in the service rates between periods 0 and 1. In contrast, the signalling e¤ect occurs at the beginning of period 2 and can be measured by the change in the patient volume between periods 1 and 2. This suggests, in principle, that both e¤ects can be identi…ed econometrically.
Data Requirement
We presume the existence of sample data on inpatient-observations for a repeated cross-section of hospitals (such data are typically part of standard hospital administrative data). For the formal empirical analysis, we de…ne the following list of variables, aggregated at the hospital level, which are consistent with those in the theoretical model: S it represents the service rate at hospital i during period t 2 f0; 1; 2g; N it represents the patient volume; W it represents patient waiting times; and X i collects exogenous covariates such as hospital's urban/rural status and teaching status (which, with out loss of generality, can be regarded as time-invariant).
Some of the hypotheses presented below rely on the availability of a binary variable Q i measuring the quality type of a hospital (with Q i = 1 for a high quality hospital). While such a variable is typically not included in standard inpatient data sets, proxies can be constructed. For example, for coronary artery bypass surgery, a hospital's quality can be assessed by studying patient outcome indicators such as mortality, complication rates, or 30-day readmission rates and comparing them to other hospitals (controlling for covariates). 21 Furthermore, for simplicity of exposition, we assume the absence of any common timetrends (other than those caused by the WTRCs) that would confound the estimation of competition and signalling e¤ects. Common time-trends, of course, could be accounted for using standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences type arguments.
Testable Predictions of the Model
Corollaries 2, 3 and 4 provide the basis for the measurement of the competition and signalling e¤ects. We present the empirical implementation in a sequence of hypotheses tests that can be taken to the data.
Corollary 2 results in several testable implications, all concerning the change in the service rate.
Hypotheses CE (Competition E¤ect) De…ne
Corollary 2 implies the following testable hypotheses:
Both terms c and c (q), by measuring the di¤erence in mean service rates across period 0 and period 1 (conditional on X i = x), capture the competition e¤ect of the WTRCs. Whereas c is an aggregate e¤ect, the term c (q), by conditioning on Q i = q, measures the competition e¤ect as a function of the quality type of a hospital. Hypothesis CE(i) states that the aggregate competition e¤ect is positive and Hypothesis CE(ii) states that the quality-speci…c competition e¤ect is positive. Hypothesis CE(ii) is stronger than Hypothesis CE(i) and can only be tested if hospital quality data are available (or can be constructed). Hypothesis CE(iii) compares the expected service rates during period 1 across di¤erent types of hospitals.
It is straightforward to develop a statistical test of the above hypotheses. For example, Hypothesis CE(i) can be tested by studying the null hypothesis
against the alternative hypothesis
Simple analogue estimators of these expected values are readily available and then rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative can be regarded as empirical evidence in favor of the presence of a competition e¤ect. Hypotheses CE(ii) and CE(iii) can be tested along similar lines.
Corollary 3 suggests a test of the signalling e¤ect based on the change in patient volume at high-quality hospitals.
Hypotheses SE (Signalling E¤ect) De…ne s (q) := E N i2 X i = x; Q i = q E N i1 X i = x; Q i = q ; for q 2 f0 ; 1 g: Corollary 3 implies the following testable hypotheses:
The term s (q) measures the signalling e¤ect for a hospital of quality type q. It is de…ned by the di¤erence in mean patient volumes between period 1 and period 2 (conditional on X i = x and Q i = q). Unlike in the case of the competition e¤ect, it is not sensible to study an aggregate signalling e¤ect, because the signalling e¤ect points in di¤erent directions for low and high quality hospitals. Hypothesis SE(i) states that the signalling e¤ect for high quality hospitals is positive (patient volume increases) and it is negative for low quality hospitals. Again, if hospital-quality data are available then statistical testing of Hypotheses SE(i) and SE(ii) is straightforward.
Lastly, Corollary 4 aides in the construction of tests that pertain to the change in waiting times due to the WTRCs.
Hypotheses WT (Waiting Times) Corollary 4 implies the following testable hypotheses:
These hypotheses state that, on average, waiting times in period 1 and period 2 are shorter than in period 0. As implied by Corollary 4, the inequalities are strict. Hypotheses WT(i) and WT(ii) aggregate across the two quality types; in contrast, Hypotheses WT(iii) and WT(iv) are conditional on quality types and thus can only be conducted if quality data is available or can be constructed.
Discussion

Patient choice upon knowing the actual waiting time
In the model we assume that a patient bases her choice on the expected waiting times given her knowledge of the hospitals'types. Hence we assume away the possibility that, after choosing a hospital and upon knowing her actual waiting time, a patient decides to switch to the other hospital. One justi…cation of this assumption is that our model relates particularly to inpatient waiting time, which is a common focus of existing policies and measures the duration from being put on the waiting list for treatment to the beginning of treatment. The in-patient waiting time does not take into account the likely lengthy diagnosis and referral period before patients are put on the waiting list. Thus by the time the patient knows her actual waiting time, she may have incurred a sunk time cost that is too high for her to switch to the other hospital.
However, we can consider the implications of our model if the sunk cost of going through diagnosis and referral is negligible and a patient has the option to switch hospital after knowing her waiting time. In this case, an uninformed patient can infer the hospitals'types from her actual waiting time, on the condition that her waiting time exceeds the maximum waiting time of the other hospital. For example, suppose there are no WTRCs and thus the hospitals choose the minimum service rate s. Then following the preliminary results 1 and 2, the maximum waiting time at the high-quality hospital is longer than that at the low-quality hospital. In this case when an uninformed patient knows that her actual waiting time exceeds the maximum waiting time at the low-quality hospital, she can infer that she has been in the high-quality hospital.
How will this alternative assumption change our results? First, as the above example indicates, it makes no di¤erence when there are no WTRCs. Because in this case only patients that have chosen the high-quality hospital may infer the hospitals' types from their actual waiting times, and they will have no incentive to switch to the low-quality hospital.
Secondly, with the WTRCs, if s h is su¢ ciently higher than s l and there are su¢ ciently many uninformed patients, then in period 1 the maximum waiting time of the low-quality hospital will be longer than that of the high-quality hospital. As a result, in period 1 some uninformed patients who …rst choose the low-quality hospital may want to switch after learning their actual waiting times. For the high-quality hospital, this means that an increase of its service rate attracts not only more patients in period 2, but also more uninformed patients in period 1. As a consequence, now in addition to period 2 the low-quality hospital has to compete with the high-quality hospital in period 1. These indicate that the WTRCs have a stronger competition e¤ect if patients have the option to switch hospital, and it may lead to a further reduction of the hospitals'waiting times after the policy.
Regarding q i
In the present model, we keep the treatment quality q i …xed and allow the hospitals to choose service rates. One justi…cation is that q i re ‡ects a relatively long-term characteristic of a hospital, whereas s i is a relatively short term variable. Realistically, however, it is possible that a hospital may have to lower the treatment quality in order to increase the service rate. In such a case, since the treatment quality and the service rate both a¤ect patient utility, when patients assess the waiting-time information they will take into account the possibility of a lowered treatment quality. Foreseeing this, hospitals will be more conservative about increasing service rates. In this sense, a decrease of treatment quality can be interpreted as an implicit cost of increasing the service rate, and consequently the WTRCs'competition e¤ect will be weakened. For example, in the case q l = q h , it is safe to conjecture that, adding the trade-o¤ between q i and s i , hospitals will choose to keep the service rate at s even if s is lower than (but not too far below) 1=4c, which is the cuto¤ level in Proposition 2. On the other hand, when hospitals do increase service rates, the resulting lower treatment qualities must be more than o¤set by the shorter waiting times, and thus the patient utility will still increase.
In the framework of signalling games, to endogenize both q i and s i entails a richer model than the current one, as the present model uses q i to denote a hospital's type. A starting point can be considering two types of hospitals, h and l, with di¤erent types incurring di¤erent costs when choosing q i and s i , or subject to di¤erent budget constraints. This remains a direction for future research.
Costs of increasing service rates
While service rate has been modelled in the theoretical literature of waiting times, e.g. Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) , to the best of our knowledge the present paper is the …rst one that explicitly assumes that it may be costly for hospitals to cut waiting times by increasing service rates. For tractability we have focused on the setting where the hospitals incur an identical marginal cost c to improve the service rate. To represent heterogeneity between hospitals caused by institutional features, it might be desirable to relax this assumption. For example in a model of quality report cards, Gravelle and Sivey (2010) allow hospitals to di¤er with respect to their quality-producing technology.
We could therefore imagine an extension to our model where the hospitals di¤er in the marginal costs of increasing service rates with c h < c l , or c h > c l . If c h < c l , then in addition to the quality di¤erence, the lower cost will provide the high-quality hospital with even stronger incentive to increase its service rate than its opponent. Thus following Corollary 2 (i), we expect that the result s e h > s e l will maintain. On the other hand, as the low-quality hospital has even less incentive to increase its service rate, the high-quality hospital faces weaker competition than when c h = c l . So following Corollary 2 (ii) and (iii) we conjecture that as the quality di¤erence increases the high-quality hospital will increase its service rate by a less scale than under the identical marginal cost c.
If c h > c l , then the cost di¤erence will attenuate the e¤ects of the quality di¤erence: While else equal the quality di¤erence means that the high-quality hospital wants to increase its service rate more than the low-quality hospital, the high-quality hospital now has to consider its higher cost, and may eventually choose a fairly low service rate. In contrast, with a lower cost the low-quality hospital may become more aggressive in the competition. Thus the results attained under the identical-marginal-cost setting will become ambiguous here. For example, if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently small, whereas c h is much larger than c l , it is possible that s e h < s e l and the low-quality hospital will attract more patients in period 2 than the high-quality hospital.
As computations in the Appendices suggest, the analysis may be more intricate if we depart from the constant-marginal-cost setting. Realistically, the cost function may take di¤erent forms, e.g. a strictly convex function c(s i ). However, as shown in the previous section, the competition e¤ect and the signaling e¤ect mainly arise from two features of the WTRCs: a commitment device, and a signalling device when hospitals di¤er in treatment qualities. Both features are not directly based on the hospitals'costs. Therefore we expect that with a more general cost function, the properties of the WTRCs, especially the competition e¤ect and the signaling e¤ect, will remain similar to what we discover under constant marginal cost.
Varying service rates across periods
To facilitate the analysis of the two-period signalling game we have assumed that a hospital's service rate, once chosen at the beginning of period-1, will remain constant in both periods. From the propositions and the corollaries, we can see that the results will remain the same under an alternative assumption. That is, the hospitals are allowed to increase the service rates by, for example, adding more beds or investing in new diagnostic equipment, but once increased the service rates cannot be scaled back in the short run. This alternative assumption can be justi…ed by the certi…cate-of-need type of requirements set by the regulators.
What if the hospitals can vary service rates in each period? In this case, in period 2 the hospitals will keep the service rate at s because it is the last period of the game. Then applying the backward-induction type of analysis, it is easy to see that the hospitals will also choose s in the …rst period. In other words, the WTRCs will only have the signalling e¤ect, but no competition e¤ect. As a result, the hospitals' period-1 patient volumes and waiting times will remain the same as before the policy. But in period 2, due to the signalling e¤ect, the high-quality (low-quality) hospital will experience a larger (smaller) patient volume, and thus a longer (shorter) waiting time.
High s
So far the study has been focused on the setting where the minimum service rate s is low, i.e. Assumption 1. In Appendix 2, we characterize the hospitals'equilibrium service rates in the setting in which the opposite of Assumption 1 holds, i.e. s > s . The results can be divided in two categories: (I) s =2(q h q l ), and (II) s < s < =2(q h q l ). In the …rst category s is so high that all patients will choose the high-quality hospital even if its service rate remains at s. Consequently, neither hospital has the incentive to improve its service rate, and thus in equilibrium both hospitals'service rates are s.
Secondly, if s is between s and =2(q h q l ), then the low-quality hospital will …nd it too costly to improve its service rate, and thus will maintain s l at s. Hence the WTRCs have no competition e¤ect on the low-quality hospital. For the high-quality hospital, although it has a stronger incentive than the low-quality hospital to increase the service rate, it will choose to increase s h only if s is not too high. Table 2 in Appendix 2 provides a complete list of the equilibrium service rates in di¤erent categories of parameters, corresponding to Propositions 2 to 3 and Lemmas 2 to 5. The complete characterization of the equilibrium service rates allows us to further analyse the WTRCs' impacts on waiting times. In Category (I), for all < 1, since the WTRCs only have the signaling e¤ect and all patients choose the high-quality hospital when they know the hospitals' types, the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time is longer than when there are no WTRCs (Corollary 6 in Appendix 2). This is in contrast to Corollary 4 above. Moreover, Category (II) is in between Assumption 1 and Category (I). In this category, for every < 1, on the one hand we can show that there exists aŝ 2 (s ; Q ) such that for all s ŝ the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time with the WTRCs is longer than when there are no report cards. On the other hand there exists as 2 (s ; Q ) such that for all s s the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time with the WTRCs is shorter than when the policy is ine¤ective (Corollary 7 in Appendix 2). However, as shown in Appendix 2, in general s 6 =ŝ. Hence to study the WTRCs' impact on waiting times for s 2 (s ; =2(q h q l )) we need to break down the analysis into speci…c cases following Lemmas 3 to 5, which remains a direction for future research.
Conclusion
A recent review by Siciliani et al. (2013) shows that "choice and competition" policies, which include activity-based funding, choice of provider, and competition, have a stronger e¤ect on reducing hospital waiting times than other policy options. A necessary component of such "choice and competition" policies is the reporting of hospital waiting times to patients and referring doctors. We argue that this component deserves more attention from researchers.
Using a signalling-game theoretical model, we clarify two e¤ects of the WTRCs, namely the competition e¤ect and the signalling e¤ect. Although the main motivation of WTRCs has been the competition e¤ect, we point out that when the hospitals qualities di¤er and are unknown to patients, the signalling e¤ect may direct more patients to the high-quality hospital, which may further increase the hospital's waiting time. We show that if the policy drives the high-quality hospital and the low-quality hospital to both increase service rates, then the competition e¤ect will outweigh the signalling e¤ect, and consequently both hospitals' waiting times will be shorter than before. We propose an empirical framework to test the theory, which utilizes critical outcome variables, including not only waiting times but also waiting lists and service rates. The empirical studies are an immediate next step for future research.
The theoretical model may be extended in several directions, such as considering heterogeneous costs, and allowing the hospitals to invest in treatment quality in the long term. In the current paper we have restricted patients to choosing between public hospitals. Waiting times play the role of rationing the stock of patients between the two hospitals but do not a¤ect the overall size of the market. Therefore another direction for future work is to consider the possibility that the WTRCs may persuade patients to use private hospitals, and so decreases the overall demand for public health care.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 3 Proof. First, under Assumption 1, and more generally for all s 2(q h q l ) , we can restrict the strategy space of the high-quality hospital to s h 2(q h q l ) : If s h 2(q h q l ) , then q h 2s h q l , and all patients will choose the high-quality hospital. This implies that for the high-quality hospital s h = 2(q h q l ) is better than all s h > 2(q h q l ) .
Second, s h < 2(q h q l ) implies that for all s l s, both hospitals will receive patients in period 2. To see this, note that on the one hand s h < 2(q h q l ) is equivalent to q h 2s h < q l , which rules out the possibility that all patients choose the high-quality hospital. On the other hand, the fact that q h > q l > q l 2s l rules out the possibility that all patients choose the low quality hospital.
Next, when both hospitals receive patients in period 2, it must be that patients are indifferent between the hospitals given their qualities and waiting times. That is
with n
h . This implies that given s h 2(q h q l ) and s l s, there are
For s h > s, there are
, which lead to the high-quality hospital's best response with respect to s l ,
with
While the equilibrium service rates derived in this proposition, as to be shown below, will be an interior solution on 
There are
, which leads to the low-quality hospital's best response with respect to s h
with s
23 Under Assumption 1, solving (1) and (2) yields
Note that since q h > q l , s , it is equivalent to showing ,
which is equivalent to
If q h q l < c , then (3) implies that
which after re-arrangement is equivalent to
while if q h q l > c , then (3) implies that
Proof of Corollary 3 Proof. In period 1, given the …rst and the second preliminary results, all informed patients will choose the high-quality hospital if and only if q h . It can be shown that < 1, which is equivalent to i . In the rest of the proof, superscript e refers to the equilibrium with the WTRCs and q h > q l .
We complete the proof in four steps.
(i) We prove that w 
which, together with with s 
Since s , it means that with the WTRCs the period-1 informed patients strictly prefer the high-quality hospital. But this contradicts the above result that with the WTRCs in period 1 some informed patients choose the low-quality hospital. Therefore it must be that n which, after substituting s
and s
; which, after denoting Z q h q l for ease of notation, is equivalent to
which is true.
(iv) We prove that w 
Proof of Corollary 5 Proof. (i) Since
, there is (ii) Since s
, there is
Thus 
and @s
Appendix 2
In this section we characterize the hospitals'service rates in the opposite case of Assumption 1, i.e.,
Assumption 2: s > s
We will focus on the general case with q h > q l , because if q h = q l then s = 1 and thus only Assumption 1 is valid.
For ease of notation, denote Q 2(q h q l ), and denote by (s l ; s h ) the equilibrium service rates in Proposition 3. To be concise, some computational details below are skipped, but they are available from the authors upon request.
Following Assumption 2, we further divide s into two categories: (I) Q s, and (II) s < s < Q .
(I) Q s Q s implies that q h 2s q l , which, as discussed at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 3, means that even if the high-quality hospital chooses the minimum service rate in period 2 all patients will choose the high-quality hospital. Thus s is a dominant strategy for the high-quality hospital, and the low-quality hospital's best response is to choose s as well. Hence in equilibrium both hospitals choose s. In other words, the WTRCs have no competition e¤ect. The lemma below summarizes this result.
Lemma 2
With the WTRCs and q h > q l , if Q s, the hospitals' equilibrium service rates are (s Because the WTRCs have no competition e¤ect in this category, the corollary below shows that, in contrast to Corollary 4, the WTRCs will cause a longer period-2 waiting time at the high-quality hospital than when the policy is ine¤ective.
Corollary 6
With the WTRCs and q h > q l , if Q s, for all < 1, the high-quality hospital's period-2 waiting time is longer than when there are no report cards.
Proof. Given Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, it is su¢ cient to show that n 2o h < n 2e h : Since < 1, when there are no report cards, in each period some uninformed patients will choose the low-quality hospital. Thus n (II) s < s < Q In this category, for the same reason as that discussed in the proof of Proposition 3, we can restrict the high-quality hospital's strategy space to [s; Q ]. We complete the analysis in four steps.
Step-1: Characterization of the low-quality hospital's best response function. Similar to that derived in the proof of Proposition 3, the low-quality hospital's best response function is Step-2: Characterization of the high-quality hospital's best response function. . But in contrast to case (c), in this case s l < Q . There are two possibilities, s l > s l as shown in Figure 9 , and s l s l as shown in Figure 10 . Step-3: We derive the equilibrium service rates for s 2 (s l ; s l ].
Lemma 3 With waiting-time report cards and q h > q l , in the case s < s < s l , the hospitals' equilibrium service rates (s Proof. In the case s < s s l , …rst, if (i) Q 2c or (ii) Q > 2c and s l > s l or (iii) Q > 2c and s < s l s l , then for s l 2 (s; Step-4: We derive the equilibrium service rates for s 2 ( s l ; Q ). The table below summarizes the hospitals'equilibrium service rates with the WTRCs, as derived in Propositions 2 and 3 and Lemmas 2 to 5. intuition is as follows. When the volume of informed patients is su¢ ciently large, without the WTRCs the low-quality hospital will still receive some informed patients. Then even if the uninformed patients know the hospitals'types, since the hospitals do not increase service rates, the previously uninformed patients will have no incentive to switch hospitals. In other words, in such a situation there is no signaling e¤ect despite uninformed patients learning hospitals' types from the WTRCs. This suggests that to study the WTRCs'impact on waiting times for s 2 (s ; Q ), we need to break down the analysis into speci…c cases according to the categories of parameters that lead to Lemmas 3 to 5.
